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1 INTRODUCTION
The most common mechanism for online authenti-
cation is the username-password. Majority of e-
commerce applications are designed to provide pass-
word authentication via an HTML form, with the
assumption that the user needs to determine if it is
safe to enter the password. In order to avoid phish-
ing attacks, the user is expected to distinguish be-
tween a phishing and a genuine website by checking
the browser security indicators.
Alternative authentication models suggest using
images for authentication, introducing variations of
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) pro-
tocols into TLS, using digital objects as passwords.
Some authentication models suggest sending one-
time password (OTP) tokens out-of-band to the user.
Most computer users have too many passwords and
keep forgetting them. Common issue for all authen-
tication models is how to restore a legitimate user
access to their account without authentication, i.e.
password reset.
In this paper, we investigate current password
based authentication models and review their impact
on phishing. We investigate two categories of issues
1) deployment obstacles for the ’stronger’ authenti-
cation models, and 2) security issues created by the
number of passwords user needs to memorize.
The analysis of these models points to a conclusion
that one authentication solution does not fit all prob-
lems. As technology increases and cost of hardware
decreases, more authentication options should be ex-
amined and implemented. Strengthening both the
user awareness and authentication to make it harder
to steal and use credentials should alleviate the phish-
ing problem.
2 PASSWORD AUTHENTI-
CATION AND PHISHING
The username-password authentication dates back
from the time when authentication was done from
physically protected terminals that are assumed to
be secure. As Internet security flaws were recog-
nised, Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol were added to protect
e-commerce applications. SSL and TSL use Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) certificates to authenticate
servers, i.e. websites, by installing trusted certificates
on client’s browsers. Most e-commerce financial insti-
tutions use these certificate and rely on trusted third
parties to authenticate certificates (i.e.users) on their
behalf. In spite of this, phishers succeed to take users
into the spoofed websites. Unfortunately, SSL can
not protect against web-based password theft used in
a phishing attack as certificates can be acquired by
any party including phishers.
The PAKE research explores an alternative ap-
proach to protect password without relying on a PKI.
PAKE schemes only require that a human memorable
secret password is shared between the participants.
Using PAKE by itself does not protect against phish-
ing, as keyloggers can record the password. Also,
if PAKE is to be used for web authentication both
server and client side need to be changed and must
participate in the PAKE protocol.
Some of the PAKE anti-phishing protocols employ
zero-knowledge authentication, which is a practical
application of the concept of a zero-knowledge proof
(ZKP). In a zero-knowledge proof, one party can
confirm whether or not a statement is true without
revealing any other property about the statement.
Other combine it with SSL or TLS. The deployment
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problem with these scheme is a high computation
cost.
Graphical passwords are generally easier to remem-
ber and use than complex alphanumeric passwords.
Hence, graphical password systems have been sug-
gested in various forms as an alternative to pass-
words. Images are used as way to successfully au-
thenticate sites, by using a randomly generated vi-
sual hash to customize the browser window or web
form elements to indicate the successfully authenti-
cated sites. Images can be also used as a password
recovery mechanism as humans can easier recognize
images than recall a secret question set a some time
in the past.
Graphical password systems also suffer from de-
ployment related issues: e.g. how to secure storage
and display of the secret image in browser; spyware
and keyloggers - a phisher can intercept an image in
the same way as a an alphanumeric password.
Two-factor authentication is deployed in various
forms: as a chip and PIN; OTP tokens - devices that
generate random passwords that is only valid for use
once, hence limiting the the amount of damage even
if the password is intercepted bu a phisher. Some
authentication system can send OTP out-of-band to
the user, for example as an SMS to the user’s phone;
or in the form of transaction numbers (TANs). One-
time password are often valid for a limited, short time
period, requiring a phisher to act immediately.
Two-factor authentication models require users to
either carry token, smart cards and require more ef-
fort on behalf of the user and provision and mainte-
nance of hardware by the service provider.
As the number of services and website increased,
most computer users have a large collection of ac-
counts with different applications. Good security
practices recommend that users should be educated
to choose high entropy passwords. In reality, users
choose simple passwords, or pick the same or simi-
lar passwords they already use for different, higher-
security applications. If the system forces them to
choose a complex password, users usually write them
down or forget them regularly. The large number
of passwords increases the chance of users forgetting
them. Questions normally used for password recov-
ery (i.e. mother’s maiden name, place of birth, or
colour of eyes) are readily available on the Internet
and are similar between websites of different security
importance.
Most of the reviewed anti-phishing authentication
models ignore the requirement of designing an au-
thentication system that is able to cope with the
fact that users periodically forget their passwords
or loose the authentication token. Most of them
rely on Email-based identification and authentication
(EBIA) automatic password reset mechanism in spite
of many security risks.
Some researchers suggest using images for as a
password recovery mechanism. Also, systems where
users are authenticated using their preferences is pro-
posed as a password recovery mechanism is suggested.
There are many organisations (e.g. governments,
financial institutions, universities) that can vouch for
a user’s identity and a specific set of attributes (age,
citizenship, memberships, student enrollment status).
These existing resources could be used as the ’fourth
factor authentication’ or as part of the initial authen-
tication or forgotten password schemes.
3 CONCLUSION
The analysis of these models points to a conclusion
that inadequate authentication mechanisms used by
the banks, credit card systems and other Internet ser-
vice providers is one of the main factors in success of
phishing attacks. Until the direct economic losses be-
come large enough, there may be little incentive for
service providers to make changes that could lead to
problems in support costs.
Problem is that authentication models that are
both secure and usable can only be devised by com-
bining shared secrets with other authentication tech-
nologies, such as biometrics, out-of-band signaling
devices or specialized hardware. Stronger authentica-
tion models require users to either carry token, smart
cards or generally require more effort on behalf of the
user. And the users are also reluctant to do so.
As many studies concluded that users are not ca-
pable to figure out if they are phished or not, we
should design authentication models in such a way
that even if the user users credentials are phished
- the damage is minimised/contained. Also, service
providers should be encouraged to use authentication
model that assumes that user can not distinguish be-
tween a phisher and a genuine website.
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